A Note on Revenue Forecasting During the Dukakis Administration by Daniel R. Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen
SL
C/AI1
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
A NOTE ON REVENUE FORECASTING








This research was supported by a grant from the Olin Foundation to Princeton
University, and by the State and Local Government Finance Project of the
National Bureau of Economic Research. However, these organizations are not
responsible for the contents of this paper. This research is part of NBER's
research program in Taxation. Any opinions expressed are those of the
authors not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.MEEK Working Paper #2667
July 1988
ANOTE ON REVENUE FORECASTING
DURING THE DUKAKIS ADMINISTRATIONS
ABSTRACT
Criticsof Governor Michael Dukakis have suggestedthat this
year's $400 million overestimateof tax revenues in Massachusetts
casts doubt on his putative managerialskills. In this paper, we
carefully examine the entire Dukakis forecastingrecord. We find
that the 1988 experience was "unusual"in the sense that on
average, revenue forecasts produced byhis administration have
been too low rather than too high.In addition, we find that
there is no significant difference betweenthe quality of the
Dukakis forecasts and those of his predecessorsin Massachusetts.
Hence, those who seek to discover anythingextraordinarily
positive or negative about Dukakis'managerial capabilities
should shift their attention to skills otherthan revenue
forecast ing.
Daniel R. Feenberg Harvey S. Rosen
National Bureau of Economic Research Department of Economics
1050 Massachusetts Avenue Princeton University
Cambridge, MA 02138 Princeton, NJ 08544I. tntroductiOfl
CustomarilY, discussions of state revenue forecasting are
consigned to the pages of journals on governmentadministration.
In recent months, however, the problems caused by large
underestimates of revenues in California, Massachusettsand New
York have received substantial publicity in thenational press.
The situation in Massachusetts has received particularattention
due to the Presidential aspirations of GovernorMichael Dukakis.
The Dukakis campaign has emphasized his superb managerialskills.
Critics of Dukakis argue that the revenue shortfallin
Massachusetts is evidence that these skills are notall that they
are cracked up to be. For example, afterthe magnitude of the
revenue shortfall became public, TheWall Street Journal
approvingly quoted a Massachusetts official who said,"The
Massachusetts Miracle is starting to sound like the last daysof
Pompeii. "1
While we do not believe that good revenue forecasting is
a
necessarilythe sine qua non for good administration, neither is
it a trivial matter. After all, sensible deliberationsabout
expenditures cannot be made in the absence of "good"forecasts.
Indeed, in the presence of constitutional or statutory provisions
for balanced budgets, unanticipated changes in revenues canwreak
havoc not only on projects that are scheduled for funding,but on
plans that have already been put into effect aswell. Hence, we
believe that an evaluation of an administration's forecasting
'Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1988, page 22.
1ability plays an important role inassessing its overall
compe t ence.
The first thing to realize whenconducting such an
evaluation is that staterevenue forecasters operate Lflan
environment characterized bygreat uncertainty. Future revenues
generated by a given revenue structuredepend on future values of
variables like employment,population, and nominal income,none
of which is easy to predict.Additional uncertainty is created
since the state tax structureitself may be changed in the
future. Such changes depend inpart on the political climate in
the state, another thing thatis hard to predict. Operatingin
such an environment, forecasterscannot be expected to obtain
precisely correct answers.
Related to this point is the observationthat it is not
sensible to evaluate an administrationsolely on the basis of any
given year's outcome. Due to randomfluctuations any particular
forecast may be quite "bad," andthis is not necessarily the
"fault" of the administration.Indeed, extraordinary
fluctuations in certain variablesmay make forecasting
intrinsically more difficult insome periods than others; one
should try to take suchfluctuations into account inevaluating
forecasts.
This paper uses such anapproach to evaluate the forecasting
record of the Dukakjs administration.The relevant institutional
issues are described in Section II.Section III discusses the
data and results. We find thatoverall, there is not much to
2distinguish the Dukakis forecasting record from that of other
Massachusetts governors. That is, on average, his forecast
errors do not differ significantly from those of his
predecessors. SectiontVconcludes with a summary.
tt.tnstitutional Background
The last week of every January the Governor of Massachusetts
submits to the legislature a budget statement that includes
forecasts of revenues and expenditures. The forecast for each
item is made over two time horizons. The first, which we call
the short forecast, is for the fiscal year that began the
previous July 1.The second, which we call the long forecast, is
for the fiscal year beginning the subsequent July 1. Hence, the
short forecast presented in January 1988 covers the period July
1, 1987 to June 30, 1988; the long forecast contained in that
message is for July 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989.
In most states, forecasts are made by a budget division
within the executive branch (Hyde and Jarocki E1983, p. 266].
The final responsibility lies with the governor, who reviews the
forecasts, and can modify them before presentation.
Massachusetts is typical in these respects. The forecasting
process begins in the October preceding the budget address, and a
set of figures is produced by the Bureau of Administration and
Finance (BA&F) in November. However, these figures are usually
revised once or twice before the budget message goes to press in
January.
Revenue forecasting methods differ widely across the states.
3Some states rely on econometric models, others on much more
informal methods.En Massachusetts, formal econometric modelling
plays a greater role than it does in many other states. The BA&F
receives econometric forecasts for Massachusetts generated by a
consulting firm Data Resources, Inc.), and then plugs these
forecasts into a micro simulation model based on Massachusetts
tax returns. However, all forecasts are subject to the judgment
of "old hands," and some revenue sources are forecast without any
formal modelling at all.
ttl. Evaluating The Revenue Forecasts
Table 1 shows total tax revenues during each year Dukakis
was governor, along with the corresponding short and long
forecasts. Thus, for example, reading the row for the year 1987
indicates that in January 1986, Dukakis predicted that the
revenues for fiscal 1987 would be $7.88 billion; in January 1987
he revised this estimate down to $7.73 billion, and actual tax
revenues were $8.10ilion. The 1988 fiasco is represented by
the fact that the short forecast of $8.64 billion exceeded actual
revenues of $8.24 billion, a shortfall of $400 million. Jote,
however, that such over—optimistic predictions of revenues are
not the rule. For the four years preceding 1988, both the short
and long forecasts were less than actual tax revenues.
Because the level of nominal tax revenues quadrupled between
1975 and 1988, comparisons across time are facilitated by
computing the forecast errors for each year as a proportion of
total revenues. This is done in Table 2. The quality of the
4short forecasts appears to have deteriorated over time in the
sense that the absolute values of the proportionalforecast
errors have increased. tnterestingly, the absolutevalue of the
proportional overestimate of 1988 revenue was about the same
magnitude as that of the underestimates for 1986 and 1987. Then
why was there so much more fuss about the 1988 error than its two
predecessors? One obvious answer is the increased prominence of
Governor Dukakis in national politics. However, this also
appears to be a manifestation of a more general phenomenon——
politiciansand journalists appear to regard over-optimistic
revenue forecasts as being worse than over—pessimistic ones.
(See Feenberg, et al. (1988].)
In any case, as we emphasized in the previous section1 a
given set of revenue forecasts cannot be analyzed in a vacuum.
We do not know whether the figures in Table 2 are "good" or "bade'
without some basis for comparison. One possibility is to compare
the Dukakis forecasting record to that of other Massachusetts
governors. This is done in Table 3.The first column shows
statistics relating to the Dukakis administrations; the second
column relates to all other governors since 1953. The first row
in the column is for reference.It indicates that during the
Dukakis years1 actual tax revenues grew at 12.1 percent annually.,
a bit higher than the 11.5 percent rate during other
administrations. The second and third rows refer to the errors
in the predictions of proportional revenue growth. Specifically,
let Rt be the actual proportional change in nominal revenues in
5year t, and Ft be the forecast of Rt .Thesecond rowshowsthe
mean value of Rt -Ft.The positive value of both of the mean
errors in row 2 indicates that on average, both Dukakis and other
Massachusetts governors tended to underestimate revenue growth.
The Dukakis short forecasts have been somewhat more optimistic
than those of other Massachusetts governors in the sense that
their mean value is closer to zero. On the other hand, Dukakis'
long forecasts have been more pessimistic.
Of course, a lower mean value might be associated with a
regime in which the forecasting is done verypoorly, but large
positive and negative errors happen to cancel each other out.To
investigate this possibility, we also computed the mean absolute
value of the forecast error. (See row 3.) For the short
forecasts, the mean absolute value of Rt —Ftis essentially the
same for Dukakis and other Massachusetts governors. For the long
forecasts, Dukakis has been more accurate in the sense that the
mean absolute error is smaller, but the difference is not
statistically significant.
tnterpretatjon of the figures in Table 3 is complicated by
the fact that the underlying difficulty of making revenue
forecasts may vary from year to year. Suppose, for example, that
income growth during the Dukakis administrations was less
volatile than during other administrations. Then in a sense it
was "easier" to forecast during his administrations, and the fact
that the proportional errors in his long forecasts were smaller
I shouldnot be attributed to any special forecasting skill. On
6the other hand, perhaps the economic environmenthe faced was
more volatile than others, in which case the figures inTable 3
do not do justice to his forecasting ability.
rn order to investigate these possibilities, we estimated
two regressions of the form:
(Rt—Ft)2 ao at tNCt2 +atNCt-i2s- a tNCt
x CPIt +aspQp.2aEMPt2 as TAXt2 a-i DUKEr
whe re2
(Rt.-F)2 square of the proportional forecast error
in year t;
INCt proportional change in nominal personal
income in period t minus its mean growth
rate;
CPIt proportional change in the Consumer Price
Index in period t minus its lagged growth
rate;
POPt proportional change in population in year t
minus its mean growth rate;
EMPt proportional change in nonagricultural employ—
ment in period t minus its mean growth rate;
TAXt proportional change in revenues due to
legislative modifications of the Governor's
tax proposals.
DUKEt 1 for revenue forecasts made during a Dukakis
administration, and zero otherwise; and
2Data sources are s follows: Employment: Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the United States,various
issues; CPI: Economic Report of the President 1987,Table 8—57;
Population and Personal Income: Bureau of Economic Analysis,
State Personal Income: 1929-82, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC 1984, pp. 79—82, and updated with variousissues
of the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Data for1988
are based on the authors' projections; when the regressionsin
Table 4 were estimated with 1988 dlted, the results were
essentially unchanged.
7random error.
The rationale behind this specification is that the squared
forecast error is a function of innovations in variables like
income, and the innovation in a particular variable can be
measured by the difference between its actual rate of growth and
its trend rate of growth.(The exception is TAXt, the "surprise"
in tax revenues due to legislative modification of the governor's
tax program. TAXt is equal to zero if the legislature does as
requested by the governor; otherwise, it is the change in
revenues attributable to the difference.) By including the
squared innovations on the right hand side of a regression with
(Rt —Ft)2as a dependent variable, we are in effect controlling
for other factors that might affect forecast errors. Thus, the
coefficient on the dichotomous variable DUKE indicates whether
the Dukakis forecasts were better or worse, holding constant the
volatility of the forecasting environment. Of course, there is
some arbitrariness in selecting a set of variables to control for
volatility, and in determining whether they should be entered
with lags and/or interacted with each other. However, the
substantive results presented below were unaffected by various
changes in specification.
The regression results are presented in Table 4.Let us
first consider the coefficient on the variable of primary
importance, DUKE.For both the long and short forecasts, the
coefficients are statistically not significantly different from
zero. We conclude that revenue forecast errors during the
8[)ukakis years were about the same as those of other Massachusetts
governors. Turning now to the other variables in Table 4, the
coefficients are generally insignificant, except for TAXt.
Apparently, uncertainty about the outcome of the legislative
process is a more important explanation for forecast errors than
volatility in the economic environment.
tV. Conclusion
We have examined data on Massachusetts tax revenue forecasts
during the Dukakis administrations in Massachusetts. Our main
findings are as follows:-
1. Despite the well-publicized shortfall in revenues in
l9, (luring most years, Dukakis' revenue forecasts
have generally been less than actual revenues.
2. The average growth rate of nominal tax revenues during
the Dukakis years was about the same as during the
administration of other Massachusetts governors since
1953.
3. On average, both Dukakis and other Massachusetts
governors have underestimated the rate of tax revenue
growth.
4. Once we control for factors that might affect the
difficulty of making revenue forecasts, there is no
statistically significant difference between the
Dukakis record of revenue forecasting and that of other
Massachusetts governors.
tn short, the 1988 shortfall in revenues is not part of a
9pattern of terribly incompetent forecasting. Onthe other hand,
thereis nothing that makes Dukakis' record as a revenue
forecaster stand out against that of his predecessors. Hence,
those who seek to discover anything extraordinarily positive or
negative about Dukakis' managerial capabilities should shift
their attention to skills other than revenue forecasting.
10Table 1
Tax Revenues and Their Forecasts*
(millions of dollars)
Total Tax Short Long
Year Revenue Forecast Forecast
1975 $ 2088 $ 2292 $ **
76 2641 2648 2395
77 2843 2824 2837
78 3208 3094 2951
79 3502 ** 3268
1983 4989 5023 **
84 5654 5467 5521
85 6412 6240 6043
86 7484 7168 6670
87 8102 7739 7875
88 8236 8636 8287
*Source: House -Bill #1, January of each year.
**Forecast not prepared by the Dukakis administration.Table 2



















































*Sc,urce: Computed from House Sill *1, January of each year.
**Forecast not prepared by the Dukakis administration.
12Table 3
Tax Revenue Forecasting*




Revenue Growth 0.121 0.115
(0.0231) (0.0199)
Short Forecasts
Mean Error 0.00632 0.0322
(0.0144) (0.0130)
Mean Absolute Error 0.0362 0.0357
(0.00827) (0.0126)
Long Forecasts
Mean Error 0.0585 0.0366
(0.0161) (0.0205)
Mean Absolute Error 0.0599 0.0754
(0.0154) (0.0159)
*Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of the means.
13Table 4
Regression Resul ts*
(Dependent Variable is (Rt-Ft)2)


















*Sample period is 195988.Numbers in parentheses are standard
errors.
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